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Abstract
In this paper, we examine the performance of the market mechanism
by focusing on whether no one, in the ‘long-run’, can be left behind with
technological innovation in the economy. We show that the market mech-
anism with technological innovation unavoidably leaves some individuals
behind. We extend this negative result to a broader class of resource al-
location mechanisms.
Keywords: dynamic market competition with technological innovation,
Hicksian Optimism, the Walrasian allocation rule, Pareto efficiency, indi-
vidual rationality
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1 Introduction: Three Basic Functions of Mar-
ket Mechanism
The market mechanism is the central subject in economics. Economics from the
age of Adam Smith till the present day has viewed the market mechanism as
having the following three basic functions:
i) it is a decentralized resource allocation mechanism that improves the welfare
of consumers as a result of market exchange;
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ii) it promotes the technological and social division of labor via specialization
as motivated by the principle of comparative advantage, and consequently, it
increases efficiency of production activities in the economy as a whole; and
iii) it promotes technical progress in order to enhance the productivity of the
economy as a whole through a dynamic process of competition among the pro-
ducers,1 and consequently it improves individual welfare progressively.
Among the three functions of the market mechanism mentioned above, the
first function is illustrated and explained in the Walrasian general equilibrium
theory as the Fundamental Theorems of Welfare Economics, while the second
function is captured and characterized in the Heckshar-Ohlin international trade
theory as the Fundamental Theorems of International Trade (in particular, the
Heckshar-Ohlin theorem).
In contrast, there are no basic results or theoretically rigorous analysis in
the literature of contemporary economics that supports the argument for the
third function of the market mechanism, despite some attempts to justify the
market economy on this ground.2 The third function of the market mechanism
seems to contain two main points. First, the market mechanism can enhance the
productivity of the economy as a whole through promoting technical progress in
the dynamic process of competition among producers. Second, assuming that
the dynamic competition in the market economy promotes technical innovation,
the market mechanism can ensure the progressive improvement of individual
welfare.
Regarding the first point, it can be argued that the market competition
does not necessarily promote technological innovation, as the knowledge of a
new technology can be regarded as a pure public good. Indeed, it is easily
diffused once it is discovered (or invented) and publicized. As a consequence,
a competitive producer may not have enough motive for R&D investment, as
the rival producers can easily freeride on the successful result of an R&D before
the competitive producer fully reaps the benefits of the R&D investment. See,
for example, Schumpeter (1939, 1942), and the evidence presented in the study
by Blundell, Griffith and van Reenen (1999) where they find, in the study of
British manufacturing firms, that the monopolist invests more in its R&D. It is
therefore further suggested that introducing the patent system would be a de-
sirable incentive scheme to encourage R&D investment, though such a scheme
regulates market competition by allowing the innovator to be a monopolist for
some restricted period of time. On the other hand, we also have the argument
that the market competition promotes technological innovation: more competi-
tion tends to diminish profits, which gives firms more incentive to innovate to
capture profits (see, for example, Arrow (1962)). The recent literature on the
topic has illustrated a complicated picture between competition and innovation
(see, among others, Aghion et al. (2005), Igami and Uetake (forthcoming)). For
1Producers are motivated by capturing extra profits via the access to the most advanced
technology.
2See, for example, Kornai (2013).
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example, Aghion et al. (2005) have shown an inverted U-shaped relationship
between innovation and competition, where some certain intermediate levels of
competition give rise to the highest level of innovation.
However, even setting aside the incentive problem of R&D investment, the
question that the market mechanism can ensure the progressive improvement of
individual welfare remains. This is because the introduction of a new technology
often involves a radical change of economic structure, which leads to the division
of the population into the “winners” and the “losers”.
The issue concerning the winners and losers seems to be easily dealt with
by the Kaldor-Hicks compensation test (Hicks (1939), Kaldor (1939)). Indeed,
if a technical progress due to innovation can be formulated as an expansion of
the production possibility set available in the economy a` la Schumpeter (1942),
then a policy encouraging such innovations would always be socially desirable
with respect to the (weaker) Kaldor-Hicks hypothetical compensation principle.
This is because, a change from a competitive equilibrium under one economy
to another competitive equilibrium under possibly another economy involves
an expansion of the production possibility set in terms of the set inclusion, and
consequently, the aggregate sum of all consumers’ ‘upper contour sets’ definitely
has a non-empty intersection with the new production possibility set. Therefore,
even if some consumer becomes a “loser” with this change, this consumer can
be (hypothetically) compensated via a suitable shift of an aggregate supply of
commodity bundles, and a suitable redistribution of the bundle.
Such a compensation is, however, just hypothetical and the Kaldor-Hicks
compensation principle provides no mechanism to implement such a compen-
sation, and as a result, a loser would be left as a “loser” in reality. There-
fore, judging such possible improvements of individual welfare by means of the
Kaldor-Hicks compensation principle alone would not be much help if the hy-
pothetical compensation cannot be actually implemented.
Nevertheless, neoclassical economics has attempted to justify the application
of the (somewhat modified) hypothetical compensation principle to evaluate
possible improvement of social welfare by appealing to the so-called Hicksian
Optimism. As stated by Corden (1984, page 68), “if Pareto efficient policies are
being pursued consistently over a long period, the chances are that eventually–
though not at every particular step–everyone will be better off.” He labels this
principle as the Hicksian Optimism and attributes it to Hicks (1941) where
Hicks writes:
“ ... then, although we could not say that all the inhabitants of that
community would be necessarily better off than they would have
been if the community had been organized on some different princi-
ple, nevertheless there would be a strong probability that almost all
of them would be better off after the lapse of a sufficient length of
time. Substantially, that is the creed of classical economics; if the
‘improvements’ are properly defined, it would appear to be a creed
that is soundly based.”
Therefore, if we follow through the above idea of Hicksian optimism, we may
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conjecture that the innovation and technological progress in the market place
can eventually benefit every individual in the society, laying a foundation for the
third function of the market mechanism, and for achieving some goals like “in-
clusive economic growth”,“shared prosperity”, and “no one being left behind”
envisioned and set forth in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development as
pledged by 193 United Nations Member States.3
The purpose of this paper is to examine this conjecture. While doing so,
we propose a theoretical framework and introduce the notion of the Hicksian
optimism in the context. We then examine whether the expansions of the so-
ciety’s production possibilities set due to innovation and technological progress
can indeed benefit every member of the society eventually (after a long period
of time).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our
basic model. Section 3 examines whether the market mechanism can deliver
the Hicksian optimism illustrated above. Section 4 extends our analysis to a
broader class of resource allocation mechanisms and examines if the Hicksian
optimism holds for those mechanisms. We conclude in Section 5.
2 A Basic Model
There are m ≥ 3 goods. Let R (resp. R+ and R++) denote the set of all real
(resp. non-negative and positive) numbers. Let Rm (resp. Rm+ and Rm++) be the
m-fold Cartesian product of R (resp. R+ and R++). For any a, b ∈ Rm, a ≥ b
denotes [a1 ≥ b1, · · · , am ≥ bm], a > b denotes [a ≥ b and a 6= b], and a  b
denotes [a1 > b1, · · · , am > bm].
There is a fixed number J of firms that are indexed by the set J = {1, · · · , J}.
For each firm j ∈ J , let Yj ⊆ Rm be firm j’s production possibility set. Each
yj = (yj1, · · · , yjm) ∈ Yj is called a production plan for firm j. We assume that
each production possibility set Yj (j ∈ J ) is closed, convex and {0} = Yj ∩Rm+ .
Let N = {1, 2, · · · , n} be the set of individuals (consumers). Each individual
i ∈ N is endowed with an initial endowment, ωi = (ωi1, · · · , ωim) ∈ Rm+ , and
has a continuous, quasi-concave and locally non-satiated utility function over
the consumption set Rm+ . Let Ω =
∑
i∈N ωi be the vector of social endowments.
An economy, to be denoted by E, is then defined as follows:
E ≡
〈
N ; (ui, ωi)i∈N ; (Yj)j∈J
〉
.
Let E denote the set of all possible economies defined above.
In the paper, we sometime consider a private ownership economy in which
consumers own shares in firms and firm profits are distributed to share holders.
In particular, for each i ∈ N and each firm j ∈ J , let θij be consumer i’s shares
in firm j’s profits: 0 ≤ θij ≤ 1 for all i ∈ N and all j ∈ J , and
∑
i∈N θij = 1
for all j ∈ J . For each i ∈ N , let θi = (θi1, · · · , θim). A private ownership
3See https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld.
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economy, to be denoted by EPO, is defined as follows:
EPO ≡
〈
N ; (ui, ωi, θi)i∈N ; (Yj)j∈J
〉
.
Let EPO denote the set of all possible private ownership economies thus defined.
An allocation, (x,y), in an economy E, specifies a consumption bundle xi
for each individual i ∈ N and a production plan yj for each firm j ∈ J .
An allocation (x,y) is feasible for the economy E if and only if
∑
i∈N xi 5
Ω+
∑
j=1,...,J yj . Let the set of all feasible allocations for E be denoted by F (E).
Given an economy E =
〈
N ; (ui, ωi)i∈N ; (Yj)j∈J
〉
, a feasible allocation (x,y)
is Pareto efficient for E if and only if there exists no other feasible allocation
(x′,y′) ∈ F (E) such that [ui(x′i) ≥ ui(xi) for all i ∈ N ] and [ui(x′i) > ui(xi) for
some i ∈ N ].
Consider a simple ‘dynamic’ economy in which there are possibly an infinite
number of periods. The periods are indexed by T = {0, 1, 2, · · · , }. An economy
in period t ∈ T , to be denoted by Et =
〈
N ; (ui, ωti)i∈N ;
(
Y tj
)
j∈J
〉
, is an
element of E . For each t ∈ T and each Et =
〈
N ; (ui, ωti)i∈N ;
(
Y tj
)
j∈J
〉
∈
E , let Ωt ≡ ∑i∈N ωti be the total social endowments in period t, and Y t ≡∑
j∈J Y
t
j be the aggregate production possibility set in period t. Thus, a simple
dynamic economy can be defined formally as a collection of period economies:
(Et =
〈
N ; (ui, ωti)i∈N ;
(
Y tj
)
j∈J
〉
)∞t=0. Let E∞ be the set of all simple dynamic
economies.
Let ϕ be an allocation rule that maps each simple dynamic economy E∞ =
(E0, · · · , Et, · · · ) ∈ E∞ to a collection of sets of feasible allocations for the period
economies: for each simple dynamic economy E∞, ϕ(E∞) = (ϕ(E1), · · · , ϕ(Et), · · · )
such that, for each period t ∈ T and each period economy Et ∈ E , ∅ 6= ϕ(Et) ⊆
F (Et).
The market mechanism is a prominent example of an allocation rule: for
a simple dynamic economy consisting of private ownership period economy
(EPOt )
∞
t=0, it selects Walrasian competitive equilibrium allocations for each pe-
riod economy EPOt . The Walrasian competitive equilibrium for a period econ-
omy EPOt is defined as follows: given a period private ownership economy,
EPOt ≡
〈
N ; (ui, ωti , θti)i∈N ; (Y tj )j∈J〉 ,
a feasible allocation (xt∗,yt∗) ∈ F (EPOt ) and a price vector p∗t ∈ Rm+ con-
stitute a Walrasian competitive equilibrium for EPOt if and only if the pair
((xt∗,yt∗) ,p∗t ) satisfies the following conditions:
(i) for each firm j = 1, . . . , J , p∗t · yt∗j ≥ p∗t · yt′j (∀yt′j ∈ Y tj );
(ii) for each individual i ∈ N , xt∗i ∈ arg maxxti∈B(p∗t ,ωti ,θti) ui (x
t
i), where
B
(
p∗t , ω
t
i , θ
t
i
) ≡
xti ∈ Rm+ | p∗txti ≤ p∗tωti + ∑
j=1,...,J
θtijp
∗
t y
t∗
j
 ;
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(iii)
∑
i∈N x
t∗
i = Ω
t +
∑
j=1,...,J y
t∗
j .
We shall refer the allocation rule associated with the market mechanism as
the Walrasian allocation rule.
3 Hicksian Optimism and the Walrasian Alloca-
tion Rule
A movement from one Pareto efficient allocation to another Pareto efficient
allocation is very likely to make someone worse off and yet someone else better
off, and the Pareto principle itself cannot be used for making welfare judgments
in such a movement. As discussed in Section 1, however, neoclassical economists
believe that “if Pareto efficient policies are being pursued consistently over a
long period, the chances are that eventually–though not at every particular
step–everyone will be better off” (Corden, 1984, page 68), which is termed as
the Hicksian Optimism.
Inspired by the above ideas, in what follows, we shall first introduce and
define the ‘improvements’ that Hicks had in mind and then formulate the prin-
ciple, the Hicksian Optimism. For this purpose, we consider a simple dynamic
economy, E∞ = (Et =
〈
N ; (ui, ωti)i∈N ;
(
Y tj
)
j∈J
〉
)∞t=0 ∈ E∞, and an econ-
omy E∗ =
〈
N ; (ui, ω∗i )i∈N ;
(
Y ∗j
)
j∈J
〉
∈ E . We say that the simple dynamic
economy E∞ = (Et)∞t=0 is expanding and converging to the economy E
∗ if
(i) for all t ∈ T : Y t + {Ωt} ⊆ Y t+1 + {Ωt+1},
(ii) for all i ∈ N and all t ∈ T : ωti ≤ ωt+1i , and ω0i < ω∗i = limt→∞ ωti ,
(iii) limt→∞ Y t + {Ωt} → Y ∗ + {Ω∗} ⊃ Y 0 + {Ω0}, and there is a sequence
of allocations, {(xt,yt)}∞t=0, such that (xt,yt) ∈ ϕ(Et) for all t ∈ T ,
limt→∞(xt,yt) = (x∗,y∗) ∈ F (E∗).
Here, the expanding process from a period economy to the next period econ-
omy within a simple dynamic economy is characterized by condition (i), which
represents the dynamic process of technical progress due to the success of techno-
logical innovation. The expansion is further re-enforced by condition (ii), where
it requires that, for each individual, a period initial endowment is (weakly)
expanding to its next period initial endowment, with the resulting initial en-
dowment strictly larger than the period 0 initial endowment. Moreover, the
dynamic transition of such expanding period-economies is characterized by con-
dition (iii), which, in particular, requires that, after the expansion, the resulting
economy is “bigger” than the initial economy.
In this formulation of the expanding and converging transition, we set aside
the issue of how the R&D investment for technological innovation can be incen-
tivized, as discussed in Section 1. Instead, we will focus on the issue whether
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such a dynamic transition of period-economies can improve individual and so-
cial welfare in the long run as captured by the idea of the Hicksian Optimism
discussed in Section 1.
‘The improvements’ that Hicks had in mind are visualized as the improve-
ments of the ‘convergent economy’ resulting from a sequence of expanding
economies over the initial economy. Our notion of an expanding and converging
economy requires more than what Hicks had in mind: the expansion occurs for
any two periods in both aggregate resources (due to technical progress) and
individual initial endowment, and is therefore much stronger than Hicks’ re-
quirement for the improvements of the economy. Now, comparing this eventual
economy, the convergent economy of a sequence of expanding economies, to the
initial economy, we can formulate the following principle requiring that no one
be made worse off:
Hicksian Optimism (HO): For any economy E∗ =
〈
N ; (ui, ω∗i )i∈N ;
(
Y ∗j
)
j∈J
〉
∈
E , any simple dynamic economy E∞ = (Et =
〈
N ; (ui, ωti)i∈N ;
(
Y tj
)
j∈J
〉
)∞t=0 ∈
E∞, if E∞ is expanding and converging to the economy E∗, then for the asso-
ciated sequence of allocations {(xt,yt)}∞t=0 with (xt,yt) ∈ ϕ(Et) for all t ∈ T ,
we have limt→∞ ui (xti) = ui
(
x0i
)
for all i ∈ N .
According to our notion of the Hicksian Optimism, the improvements based
on ‘expansion policies’ should leave no one behind–every individual will be made
at least as well-off as before adopting those expansion policies.4 Note that it is
not required that everyone should (weakly) benefit at each period of the expan-
sion policies. It merely requires that, eventually and this could be a long time
requiring ‘a great deal of human patience, more patience than is characteristic
of the twentieth century, even of the economists of the twentieth century; more
patience, perhaps, than we ought to ask’ as observed by Hicks (1941) himself,
no one is going to get hurt. Since our notion of an expanding and converging
economy demands more than what Hicks requires for the expansion of the econ-
omy, our formulation of the Hicksian optimism is therefore much weaker than
what Hicks had in mind, making our version of the Hicksian optimism even
more appealing.
Our notion of Hicksian Optimism formally resembles various monotonicity
properties proposed in the related literatures of axiomatic bargaining (Kalai
(1977)), and of resource allocations (see, for example, Chambers and Hayashi
(2017), Chun and Thompson (1988), Moulin and Roemer (1989), Moulin and
Thompson (1988), and Roemer (1986)). Apart from being introduced in differ-
ent frameworks and for different purposes, there is one more important differ-
ence: we require the expansion be such that, for every individual i, ω∗i > ω
0
i and
ωt+1i ≥ ωti for t ∈ T ; in other words, with the expansion of the economy, apart
4It may be of interest to note that our idea that ‘no one is left behind’ exposed in the
Hicksian Optimism is similar to that advocated and used by the UNDP: “People get left behind
when they lack the choices and opportunities to participate in and benefit from development
progress.” (UNDP, 2018)
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from more aggregate resources becoming available, every one’s initial endow-
ment becoming (weakly) larger and larger and eventually strictly larger than
his period 0 initial endowment.
The Hicksian Optimism seems a very mild requirement on an allocation rule.
Before we examine a general allocation rule, we first ask the following question:
how does the market mechanism (or the Walrasian allocation rule) fare with
respect to the Hicksian Optimism? The answer is given in the following result
whose proof can be found in the Appendix.
Theorem 1 Suppose there are at least two individuals, i1 and i2, such that
ω0i1  0 and ω0i2  0. Then, the Walrasian allocation rule does not satisfy
Hicksian Optimism.
Therefore, the market mechanism does not deliver the Hicksian Optimism:
in a market system, economic expansions cannot avoid leaving some individu-
als behind–some individuals would be made worse off than the pre-expansion
economy.
4 Any Efficient and Individually Rational Allo-
cation Rule Is Not Hicksian Optimistic
In this section, we extend our analysis of the market mechanism to a broader
class of mechanisms of allocating resources and examine the fate of the Hicksian
optimism in these contexts. For this purpose, we introduce the following two
familiar axioms for allocation rules that would be embedded in the class of
resource allocation mechanisms that we have in mind.
Pareto Efficiency (PE): For each simple dynamic economy E∞ =〈
N ; (ui, ωti)i∈N ;
(
Y tj
)
j∈J
〉∞
t=0
∈ E∞, for all t ∈ T , and for every allocation
(xt,yt) ∈ ϕ (Et) of Et, (xt,yt) is Pareto efficient for Et.
Individual Rationality (IR): For each simple dynamic economy E∞ =〈
N ; (ui, ωti)i∈N ;
(
Y tj
)
j∈J
〉∞
t=0
∈ E∞, for all t ∈ T , and every allocation (xt,yt) ∈
ϕ (Et) of Et, [∀i ∈ N : ui (xti) ≥ ui (ωti)].
Pareto Efficiency requires that an allocation rule always pick up an efficient
allocation in any given economy, and Individual Rationality requires that an
allocation rule be such that anyone’s welfare from the allocation chosen by
the allocation rule is at least as great as his/her welfare derived from his/her
initial endowment.5 Note that both of the axioms, PE and IR, are satisfied by
5Note that we could have introduced a stronger individual rationalilty condition than this
version of IR by incorporating information concerning individuals’ ownerships of production
technologies. Since our result is an impossibility result (see the theorem below), it becomes
unnecessary to formulate a stronger individual rationality condition.
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the Walrasian allocation rule. It is also of interest to note that, apart from the
Walrasian allocation rule, there are other allocation rules satisfying PE and IR:
the allocation rule that always selects ‘core allocations’ of any given economy is
both Pareto efficient and individually rational.
The two axioms capture a broader class of allocation rules, and thus a
broader class of resource allocation mechanisms. Can any such allocation rules
deliver the Hicksian optimism? The answer is given in the following result and
its proof can be found in the Appendix.
Theorem 2 Suppose there are at least two individuals, i1 and i2, such that
ω0i1  0 and ω0i2  0. Then, there exists no allocation rule satisfying Hicksian
Optimism, Pareto Efficiency and Individual Rationality simultaneously.
Therefore, any resource allocation mechanism characterized by an efficient
and individually rational allocation rule is bound to leave some individual behind
even if the economy is expanding due to technological innovation and even after
a long period of time.
5 Conclusion
We have shown that the market mechanism characterized by the Walrasian al-
location rule cannot deliver the Hicksian optimism–an ideal as envisioned by
Hicks (1941) and, more recently, as advocated by the UNDP (2015) in its 2030
Agenda for Sustainable Development. Indeed, any resource allocation mecha-
nism characterized by an efficient and individually rational allocation rule faces
the same dilemma: with continued technological innovation and progress, some
one is bound to be left behind even after a long period of time.6
Pareto efficiency is deeply rooted in economics and is highly appealing for
resource allocation. Given the tremendous technological innovation made in
recent human history and the great economic progress made in recent decades,
the Hicksian optimism seems a very attractive property to be demanded for re-
source allocation mechanisms. If we follow these lines of reasoning, the property
of individual rationality needs a careful and possibly critical examination.
To begin with, we note that, as our result in Section 3 shows, the unfettered
market mechanism characterized by the Walrasian allocation rule cannot deliver
Hicksian optimism. Part of the reasons is that the Walrasian allocation rule is
both efficient and individually rational. Suppose we abandon individual ratio-
nality but still want to use the market mechanism to allocate resources. One
possibility is to use the market mechanism coupled with a redistributive scheme
6It is of interest to note that, in a related paper by Chambers and Hayashi (2017), they
show that, in a static pruduciton economy with constant returns to scale technologies, there
is no allocation rule satisfying Pareto efficiency, technological monotonicity (introduced by
Roemer (1986)), and a stronger version of individual rationality (what they call Free Access
Lower Bound).
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(perhaps similar to that required for the second welfare theorem) to ensure that,
eventually, every individual is at least as well-off as period t = 0. Resource-wise,
this is feasible since the economy is expanding and everyone’s eventual initial
endowment (ω∗i ) is bigger than his/her initial endowment, ω
0
i , in period 0. Of
course, the Walrasian allocation rule coupled with a redistributive scheme may
violate individual rationality introduced in Section 4, the reason being that,
some individuals may be made worse off than their initial endowments in that
period after redistributions.
If, on the other hand, one wants to go beyond the market mechanism,
there are several studies on certain egalitarian type allocation rules for spe-
cific economies involving one input and one output, where it has been shown
that the proposed allocation rules are Pareto efficient and satisfy some techno-
logical monotonicities. See the contributions by Moulin (1987, 1990), Moulin
and Roemer (1989), and Roemer and Silvestre (1987). An important reason
why they have obtained positive results is that their economies involve one in-
put and one output and, in such specific economies, the property of individual
rationality almost has no bite, while in our economy, individual rationality is
no trivial and is rather stringent.
6 References
Aghion, P., N. Bloom, R. Blundell, R. Griffith, and P. Howitt (2005). “Com-
petition and Innovation: An Inverted U Relationship.” Quarterly Journal of
Economics 120: 701-28.
Arrow, K.J. (1962): “Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for
Inventions,” in Nelson, R.R. (ed.), The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity:
Economic and Social Factors. Princeton University Press. Princeton.
Blundell, R., R. Griffith and J. van Reenen (1999). “Market Share, Market
Value and Innovation in a Panel of British Manufacturing Firms.” Review of
Economic Studies, Vol. 6, No. 3: 529-554.
Chambers, C.P. and T. Hayashi (2017). “Can everyone benefit from innova-
tion?” Manuscript dated June 16, 2017.
Chun, Y. and W. Thomson (1988). “Monotonicity properties of bargaining
solutions when applied to economics.” Mathematical Social Sciences, vol. 15,
issue 1, 11-27.
Corden, W. M. (1984): “The Normative Theory of International Trade,” in
Handbook of International Economics, vol. 1, edited by R. W. Jones and P.B.
Kene, 63-130.
Hicks, John (1939). ”The Foundations of Welfare Economics”. Economic Jour-
nal. The Economic Journal, Vol. 49, No. 196. 49 (196): 696–712.
Hicks, J. (1941): “The Habilitation of Consumers’ Surplus,” Review of Economic
Studies 8, 108-116.
10
Igami, M. and K. Uetake (forthcoming): “Mergers, Innovation, and Entry-Exit
Dynamics: Consolidation of the Hard Disk Drive Industry, 1996-2016.” The
Review of Economic Studies, forthcoming.
Kalai, E., (1977): “Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interper-
sonal Utility Comparisons,” Econometirca 45, 1623-1630.
Kaldor, N. (1939). “Welfare Propositions in Economics and Interpersonal Com-
parisons of Utility.” The Economic Journal, Vol. 49, No. 195, 49 (195): 549–
552.
Kornai, J. (2013): Dynamism, Rivalry and the Surplus Economy: Two Essays
on the Nature of Capitalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, Translated by
Brian McLean.
Moulin, H. (1987). “A core selection for regulating a single-output monopoly.”
The Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 18, No. 3, 397-407.
Moulin, H. (1990). “Joint Ownership of a Convex Technology: Comparison of
Three Solutions.” The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 57, No. 3, 439-452.
Moulin, H. and J. Roemer (1989). “Public ownership of the external world
and private ownership of self.” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 97, No. 2,
347-367.
Moulin, H. and W. Thomson (1988). “Can everyone benefit from growth? Two
difficulties.” Journal of Mathematical Economics, Vol. 17, 339-345.
Roemer, J. (1986). “The mismarriage of bargaining theory and distributive
justice.” Ethics 97, 88-110.
Roemer, J., and J. Silvestre (1987). “What is public ownership?” Working
Paper, No. 294. Davis: Univ. of California, Dept of Economics.
Schumpeter, J.A. (1939). Business Cycles: A Theoretical, Historical and Sta-
tistical Analysis of the Capitalist Process. New York: McGraw Hill.
Schumpeter, J.A. (1942). Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. New York:
Harper & Row.
United Nations Development Programme (2015). The 2030 Agenda for Sustain-
able Development.
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld
United Nations Development Programme (2018). What does it mean to leave
no one behind? A UNDP discussion paper and framework for implementation,
https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/poverty-reduction/what-
does-it-mean-to-leave-no-one-behind-.html
11
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 2. Let n = 2 and m = 3, where the third commodity is
used as a primary factor. Given ε ∈ (0, 12), let a ∈ R+ be such that a > 1−εε ,
which implies that a > 1. Let δ¯ and δ be sufficiently small with δ¯ > δ > 0. Let
(ui)i∈N be defined by
7
u1 (x11, x12, x13) ≡ min
{x11
a
(1 + δ) , x12
}
and u2 (x21, x22, x23) ≡ u1 (x22, x21, x23)
For t ∈ T , let ωt1 = ωt2 =
(
t+1
t+2aε(a+ δ¯, 1 + δ¯), 1
)
.8 Let the production pos-
sibility set Y t at t ∈ T , be a convex cone in R2 × (−R+) and the corre-
sponding output possibility set of two commodities when two units of good 3
are used be represented by Y t1,2 ≡
{
(y1, y2) ∈ R2 | (y1, y2,−2) ∈ Y t
}
.9 Let Y 01,2
be given by the comprehensive hull of (1, 1)− (Ω01,Ω02) in R2, which is denoted
by Y 01,2 = comp
{
(1, 1)− (Ω01,Ω02)}. However, since the production possibility
set is always a convex cone, the third good does not enter into any individual’s
utility function as defined above, and we will focus on any efficient allocation
rule here, it is sufficient to have only the information of the output possibility
set of two commodities, 1 and 2, when two units of good three are used at
each t ∈ T . Therefore, without loss of generality, we will use, in the following
discussion, the notation Y t as the representation of the output possibility set of
two commodities 1 and 2 when two units of good three are employed. That is,
as an abuse of notation, we will use the notation Y t + {Ωt} for t ∈ T , such as
Y 0 +
{
Ω0
} ≡ comp {(1, 1)} for t = 0.
Let {Y t + {Ωt}}∞t=0 be a sequence of period economies such that for any
t = 0, Y t + {Ωt} ⊆ Y t+1 + {Ωt+1} and limt→∞ Y t + {Ωt} = Y ∗ + {Ω∗} such
that Y ∗ + {Ω∗} ≡ comp {(a, 1 + δ)}. Note that limt→∞ ωt1 = limt→∞ ωt2 =(
ε(a+ δ¯, 1 + δ¯), 1
)
= ω∗1 = ω
∗
2 . Since δ¯ > δ, it follows that ε (a, 1 + δ) 
(ω∗11, ω
∗
12) and ε (a, 1 + δ) (ω∗21, ω∗22).
Let an allocation rule ϕ satisfy PE, IR, and HO. Then, for any sequence
{(xt,yt)}∞t=0 such that (xt,yt) ∈ ϕ (Et), and any subsequence
{(
xt
k
,yt
k
)}∞
tk=0
of {(xt,yt)}∞t=0, let limtk→∞
(
xt
k
,yt
k
)
= (x∗,y∗) ∈ F (E∗) for E∗ =〈N ; (Xi)i∈N ; (ui)i∈N ; Ω∗;Y ∗〉. Then, by PE and IR, every allocation (xtk ,ytk)
at period tk within the subsequence
{(
xt
k
,yt
k
)}∞
tk=0
is Pareto efficient and
7The specific utility functions are used here to provide a simplest economy to establish our
result. We may note that, at the expense of increasing complexity, it is possible to consider
a more standard type of utility functions, where utility functions are strongly monotonic and
are not the Leontief preferences of the first two goods, for the proof.
8The specification of the equal endowments for the two individuals is not essential, but
simply for the sake of simplicity. Indeed, basically the same logic of proof can be worked out
with the two individuals having different endowments.
9This production possibility set is the set of (net) outputs which can be produced by using
all the individuals’ endowments of good 3 as input.
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individual rational for Etk , and so is (x
∗,y∗) for E∗.10 Therefore, u1 (x∗1) =
u1 (ε (a, 1 + δ) , 0) and u2 (x
∗
2) = u2 (ε (a, 1 + δ) , 0). Thus, u1 (x∗1) = min
{
εa
a (1 + δ) , ε (1 + δ)
}
=
ε (1 + δ) and u2 (x
∗
2) = min
{
εa, ε(1+δ)
2
a
}
= εa (1 + δ)
2
. Note that, as εa− εa > 0,
εa − ε(1+δ)2a > 0 holds for the sufficiently small δ > 0. Then, u2 (x∗2) 5
(1+δ)2(1−ε)
a holds. To see, suppose that u2 (x
∗
2) >
(1+δ)2(1−ε)
a . This implies
that x∗21 >
(1+δ)2(1−ε)
a , x
∗
22 > (1 + δ) (1− ε). Then, x∗11 < a − (1+δ)
2(1−ε)
a and
x∗12 < ε (1 + δ). Therefore,
u1 (x
∗
1) < min
{
(1 + δ)
[
1− (1 + δ)
2
(1− ε)
a2
]
, ε (1 + δ)
}
= ε (1 + δ) .
Note that 1− (1+δ)2(1−ε)a2 > ε holds, as a2− (1 + δ)2 (1− ε)−a2ε = a2 (1− ε)−
(1 + δ)
2
(1− ε) =
(
a2 − (1 + δ)2
)
(1− ε) = (a+ (1 + δ)) (a− (1 + δ)) (1− ε) >
0 by a > 1 and δ being sufficiently small. Then, since u1 (x
∗
1) < ε (1 + δ) 5
u1 (x
∗
1), we have a contradiction. Therefore, u2 (x
∗
2) 5
(1+δ)2(1−ε)
a holds. By
HO, for any
(
x0,y0
) ∈ ϕ (E0), u2 (x02) 5 (1+δ)2(1−ε)a holds.
Let {Y ′t + {Ω′t}}∞t=0 be a sequence such that, Y ′0 + {Ω′0} = Y 0 + {Ω0}, for
any t = 0, Y ′t+ {Ω′t} ⊆ Y ′t+1 +{Ω′t+1} and limt→∞ Y ′t+ {Ω′t} = Y ′∗+ {Ω′∗}
such that Y ′∗+ {Ω′∗} ≡ comp {(1 + δ, a)}. Then, by a symmetric argument, we
obtain for any
(
x0,y0
) ∈ ϕ (E0), u1 (x01) 5 (1+δ)2(1−ε)a holds.
Consider a feasible allocation
(
z,y0
)
with z =
((
a
a+1 ,
1
a+1 , 0
)
,
(
1
a+1 ,
a
a+1 , 0
))
at E0. Then, u1 (z1) = u2 (z2) = min
{
a
a+1
(1+δ)
a ,
1
a+1
}
= 1a+1 . However,
1
a+ 1
− (1 + δ)
2
(1− ε)
a
> 0 for the sufficiently small δ > 0,
as 1a+1 − (1−ε)a > 0 = aε+ε−1a(a+1) > 0 by a > 1−εε . Thus, we have ui (zi) > ui
(
x0i
)
for all i ∈ N . This implies (x0,y0) cannot be Pareto efficient, a contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 1. We note that the Walrasian rule satisfies Individual
Rationality. Further, given our assumptions on each individual’s preferences,
by the first theorem of welfare economics, the Walrasian rule satisfies Pareto
Efficiency. Then, noting that, for two individuals, i1 and i2, we have ω
0
i1
 0
and ω0i2  0, Theorem 1 then follows easily from Theorem 2. 
10The last property follows from the fact that the Pareto efficient and individually ratio-
nal correspondence, that is, the allocation rule selecting all Pareto efficient and individually
rational allocations at each and every economy, is upper hemi-continuous.
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